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The production of law-including the choice of a law's subject matter,
the timing of its enactment and the manner in which it is publicized and
perceived by the public-is significantly driven by an extra-legal market in
which politicians and private parties compete over the opportunity to engage
in bias arbitrage. Bias arbitrage is the extraction ofprivate benefits through
actions that identify and mitigate discrepancies between actual risks and the
public's perception of the same risks.
Politicians arbitrage these discrepancies by enacting laws that address
the misperceived risk and contain a "placebo effect"--a counter-bias that
attempts to offset the pre-existing misperception. If successful, politicians
are able to take credit for the change in perceived risk, while social welfare
is enhanced by the elimination of deadweight loss caused by risk
misperception.
However, politicians must compete with private parties such as insurers
and the media, who can engage in bias arbitrage using extra-legal means.
This Article analyzes methods in which parties engage in bias arbitrage and
the effect of interaction between potential bias arbitrageurs on the
production of law.
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I. Introduction
A significant portion of legal scholarship examines the manner in which
law' directs behavior.2 Law is usually seen as directing behavior by
manipulating incentives--either by imposing sanctions to dissuade from certain
behavior or by offering benefits to encourage a certain behavior.3
1. Bias arbitrage uses as its vehicle not only legislated acts, but all types of legal
actions-legislative, judicial, administrative, and executive. For the sake of simplicity, I use the
term "law" throughout the Article to refer to any type of legal action. The implementation of the
legal action will be called "enacting the law," and the implementer will be called a "politician."
2. See Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic
Analysis of Law, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW & ECONOMICS 189, 191 (Eric A. Posner, ed.,
2000) ("The economic analysis of law... tries to explain and predict the behavior of
participants in and persons regulated by the law.").
3. See, e.g., Patricia Funk, Is there an Expressive Function of Law? An EmpiricalAnalysis
of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9 Am. L. & ECON. REv. 135, 135-36 (2007) ("The classic
'Law & Economics'-approach focuses on deterrence: [A] law enforced by sanctions increases the
expected costs of the regulated activity and thereby induces compliance.").
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Laws certainly affect individuals' incentives, and through them they direct
individuals' behavior. But laws also have an equally important impact on
individuals' behavior through a different mechanism-the manipulation of the
individuals' perceptions, particularly perceptions regarding the probability and
magnitude of risks.4 As a result of this effect on perceptions, a law may
increase social welfare without having a "real" effect on incentives 5 simply by
causing individuals to think that it does have an effect.6 Because of the
4. A "risk," as the term is used in this Article, relates not only to the probability of an
event but also to its magnitude. In other words, the disutility to an individual from risk (as the
term is used here) may lie not only in the uncertainty itself, but also in the occurrence of the
underlying event that is subject to uncertainty. The broad definition of risk is important
because, as I will discuss, infra Part IV.B, bias arbitrage techniques that affect the perceived
magnitude of the underlying event are alternatives to (and compete with) bias arbitrage
techniques that affect the perceived probability of the event. Both types of techniques correct
gaps between perceived and actual risk.
5. 1 call a law's effects on incentives "real" because they affect the objective payoffs of
individuals, as opposed to effects on perceptions which affect subjective assessments. Both
effects cause a "real" (i.e., objective) change in behavior and a "real" impact on social welfare.
6. This effect (a "placebo effect") should not be confused with a phenomenon known as
"psychic utility." Psychic utility is a benefit (or harm) that individuals reap from their
satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the existence of a law. See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux,
Roger E. Meiners & Todd J. Zywicki, Talk is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL.
L. 765, 768 (1999) (describing existence value as the physiological benefit one experiences
from knowing something exists). Psychic utility is entirely subjective. It is caused by
manipulation of subjective perception and has purely subjective effects. Conversely, the
placebo effect discussed in this paper, though it is caused by manipulation of subjective
perception, has objective effects (an increase or decrease in activity related to the risk that is
addressed by the law). To illustrate the difference, a person may derive psychic disutility
knowing that a racist law repugnant to her exists, even if it is not effective or even enforced.
For example, a colonial Massachusetts law enacted in 1675 prohibits Native Americans from
entering the city of Boston. See Yvonne Abraham, Menino Seeks to Repeal 1675 Law Against
Native Americans: Symbolic Act Seen as Step Forward, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 25, 2004, at B4
(reporting that Boston Mayor Thomas Menino called the legislature to repeal an unenforced
colonial era law prohibiting Native Americans within the city limits). The same law does not
create a placebo effect if the person knows that the law is unconstitutional and void because she
would know that the law would have no objective effect. Conversely, a law cannot create
psychic utility to an individual who does not know about the law, yet the same law can cause a
placebo effect, or more precisely, as I will explain in Part III.C, an anti-placebo effect.
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superficial similarity to the placebo effect in medicine,7 I call this effect of laws
on behavior (and on social welfare) the "placebo effect" of the law.
8
Placebo effects are created when laws are presented in a way that, due to
cognitive biases, cause many individuals to either over-estimate or under-
estimate the impact of the law on a risk that the law addresses. 9 Some such
biases can be created inadvertently, but often they are created deliberately by
politicians who reap personal benefits from the law's manipulation of
perceptions.'l This behavior is a form of "bias arbitrage"-identifying a risk
that is either over- or under-estimated by a segment of the public and reaping a
private profit from an action that mitigates the discrepancy between the actual
and the perceived risk. Though bias arbitrage appeals to the politician's self-
interest, even politicians who care for the interest of their constituents rather
than their self-interest may find themselves forced to bias arbitrage (by
consciously focusing in the short-term on addressing misperceived risks) in
order to politically survive long enough to implement long-term policies.'I
Enacting laws with placebo effects is only one way to engage in bias
arbitrage.' 2 Politicians compete with others, such as the media and insurers,
who engage in bias arbitrage using methods that do not involve enacting laws. 3
Politicians' behavior in enacting laws that have placebo effects (as many laws
7. See Ral de la Fuente-Femindez et al., Expectation and Dopamine Release:
Mechanism of the Placebo Effect in Parkinson's Disease, 293 SCIENCE 1164, 1164 (2001)
(describing the medical placebo effect in treatment of Parkinson's Disease). This is not to say
that the process through which medical placebos affect health is similar to the process in which
legal placebos affect social welfare. Medical placebos seem to involve physiological processes.
Legal placebos simply utilize cognitive biases to manipulate behavior, as I will explain in Part
III.C.
8. See Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law's Role in Manipulating
Expectations, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 54, 55 (2006) [hereinafter Aviram, Placebo Effects]
(arguing that laws have an effect on general welfare by changing the risk expectations of those
subject to the law); see also Amitai Aviram, In Defense of Imperfect Compliance Programs, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 773-78 (2005) (applying the placebo effect concept to criminal law
leniency policies towards corporations that implement compliance programs).
9. See Aviram, Placebo Effects, supra note 8, at 62-68 (defining and describing placebo
effects of the law).
10. See id. at 77-79 ("The people who enact laws (i.e., politicians) harness these biases by
shaping both the issues that laws address and the manner in which laws are drafted and
presented to the public.").
11. See infra Part III.A (elaborating on the incentives of the honest politician to engage in
bias arbitrage).
12. See infra Part III (discussing how government engages in bias arbitrage).
13. See infra Part IV (exploring how nongovernment entities engage in bias arbitrage);
infra Part IV.A (describing how government and nongovemment entities compete over
engaging in bias arbitrage).
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do) is better understood in the competitive context in which it operates
alongside private players, all of whom struggle to extract private gains from
eliminating biases.14
In Part II of this Article, I survey the forces that create discrepancies
between actual and perceived risks which create the opportunity for bias
arbitrage. In Part III, I explain how politicians use laws to engage in bias
arbitrage. Part IV will examine how nonlegal actors engage in bias arbitrage.
In conclusion, Part V will discuss the market that forms from competition (and
cooperation) between public and private bias arbitrageurs.
II. Cognitive Biases Create Fertile Ground for Bias Arbitrage
After Hurricane Katrina battered the Gulf Coast in late August 2005 and
subsequent levee failures resulted in the flooding of low lying areas in New
Orleans, reports from the city and its surroundings portrayed mayhem, best
.described as surreal.' 5 Police officers in Westwego, Louisiana were told that
400 to 500 armed looters were advancing on their town. 16 In the city's
Convention Center, SWAT teams were deployed to capture groups of men who
were said to have taken over some of the halls. 17 Media reports included
"roving bands of armed gang members attacking the helpless, and dozens of
bodies being shoved into a freezer at the Convention Center."' 8 New Orleans'
police chief appeared on television and reported that "little babies [were]
getting raped" at the Superdome. 19
The reports above, like numerous others, were unfounded. In all of
Louisiana, only four of the 841 recorded hurricane-related deaths were due to
gunshot wounds. 20 Hurricane Katrina caused a tremendous amount of suffering
14. See infra Part V.A (explaining the competition between government and
nongovernment entities in exploiting biases).
15. See, e.g., Howard Witt & Michael Martinez, Thousands FearedDead in Lawless City,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 2005, at 1 (describing reports of crime looting and virtual anarchy).
16. See Jim Dwyer & Christopher Drew, Fear Exceeded Crime's Reality in New Orleans,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,2005, at Al (explaining the effect of rumors on the ability and willingness
of police to act).
17. See id. (noting several examples of official response to reports of crime in New
Orleans following Hurricane Katrina).
18. Susannah Rosenblatt & James Rainey, Rita's Aftermath: Katrina Takes a Toll on
Truth, News Accuracy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at A16.
19. Id.
20. See id. (contrasting the actual violent crime in the convention center with the
exaggerated media reports).
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in New Orleans, but the tidal wave of violent crime that was reported in its
wake was grossly exaggerated.2'
Severe misperceptions of risk are not limited to traumatic situations. They
are an inevitable result of the human mind's use of heuristics-mental shortcuts
that manifest themselves as "gut feelings." Heuristics facilitate immediate
analysis of complex information, but like any analytical mechanism, heuristics
sometimes fail. Failures that occur in predictable patterns are called cognitive
biases.2
Through observation and experimentation, scholars have identified a
number of cognitive biases.23 For example, a cognitive bias known as the
illusion of control is a pattern of over-optimism regarding events whose
outcome depends partially on an individual's skill and partially on other
circumstances.24 As a result of such a bias an individual may under-estimate
the risk to herself from a car accident because of optimism about her driving
skills, even though a car accident may occur despite her best efforts due to
another's poor driving.
The availability bias is another cognitive pattern by which people "assess
the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which
instances or occurrence can be brought to mind., 25 In other words, if we
recently encountered, read about, or heard from others of a certain event, we are
likely to over-estimate the frequency or probability of that event. The
availability bias can be exacerbated by another bias-social amplification,
which is the tendency of one's perception of a risk to be influenced by others'
perceptions.26 As a result of these two biases, a highly-publicized event such as
the hijacking of a plane may cause over-estimation of the probability of
hijacking. Such events receive significant media coverage, which brings to the
21. See id. (noting several instances of unverified rumors repeated by various news
sources that turned out to be false or exaggerated).
22. See John E. Montgomery, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Tort Litigation: A
Proposal to Limit Their Effects Without Changing the World, 85 NEB. L. REv. 15, 16 (2006)
(describing cognitive biases and heuristics and their effects on decision making).
23. For discussions of research demonstrating various cognitive biases, see generally,
COGNrrIVE ILLUSIONS (Rudiger F. Pohl, ed., 2004).
24. See, e.g., Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 311, 313 (1975) ("An illusion of control is defined as an expectancy of a personal
success probability higher than the objective probability would warrant.").
25. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (1974).
26. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1119,1130 (2002) (book
review) (using the Three Mile Island incident as an example of an event for which, although no
one was injured, the costs were amplified due to distrust of an industry).
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mind of each individual an instance of a hijacking (an event that, but for the
media, he would probably not be aware of). The "availability" of such an event
triggers the availability bias and is likely to cause an increase in the risk
perceived by each individual. In addition, because the same media coverage is
observed by many individuals, the increase in perceived risk would be
exacerbated through social amplification, as one person's heightened concern
about airplane hijacking would cause an increase in the same concern by others.
The study of cognitive biases is still in its infancy. Cognitive biases are
constantly being identified and refined as more subtle patterns emerge from
27experiments. At this time, a wide range of observed misperceptions is
unexplained, or is explained ex post as a "just so" story that is not useful for ex
ante predictions.28 Nonetheless, our understanding of cognitive biases is
improving. This Article does not make a contribution to the understanding of
cognitive biases, but rather illuminates a process-bias arbitrage-that becomes
more feasible (and therefore, presumably, more frequently employed) as
cognitive biases are better understood.
How does the study of cognitive biases affect bias arbitrage? In addition
to explaining why actual and perceived risks diverge, the research on cognitive
biases facilitates bias arbitrage in two ways. First, as our knowledge of biases
improves, it is easier to predict when a certain group misperceives a risk.29 It
also provides a more accurate estimate of the magnitude of the misperception.
This allows potential arbitrageurs to identify the risk that they want to arbitrage.
Second, improved understanding of biases can be used (or abused) to take
actions that bias people more effectively. As I will explain in the next Part,
politicians engage in bias arbitrage by enacting laws that counter-bias the
public. Advances in the study of biases may make such counter-biasing more
effective and, therefore, increase politicians' desire to engaging in bias
arbitrage.
27. See generally ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. Camerer, George
Loewenstein & Matthew Rabin, eds., 2004) (describing the results of numerous experiments in
behavioral economics).
28. Cf Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation
and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV., 747, 772-77 (2001) (describing the cognitive bias
of devaluation in the context of discrimination based on gender and race without providing an
explanation of what creates the bias); Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical
Demonstrations that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J.
1391, 1411-20 (2006) (discussing hindsight bias in the context of patent law but not explaining
why different actors have hindsight bias).
29. See William M. Sage, Joshua Graff Zivin, & Nathaniel B. Chase, Bridging the
Relational Regulatory Gap: A Pragmatic Information Policy for Patient Safety and Medical
Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1295 ("Individuals often respond to information about
risks such as medical error in predictable ways, based on well-established cognitive biases.").
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The discrepancies between a perceived risk and the actual risk caused by
cognitive biases create opportunities for extracting private benefits through
arbitrage.3° In the next section, I will describe how government uses law as a
vehicle to engage in bias arbitrage. Then, in the following section, I will
describe how private parties compete with government through their own,
extra-legal means of bias arbitrage.
III. Government Engages in Bias Arbitrage
A. Law as a Byproduct of Bias Arbitrage
The enactment, presentation, and enforcement of law affect individuals'
perceptions, including their perception of risks. Laws signal to individuals the
values of their government and society, knowledge of which may modify the
individuals' own values.3' In addition, laws affect individuals' expectations
about government's behavior. For example, a law that criminalizes speeding
creates an expectation that government will attempt to detect and punish
speeders, while a law that organizes an airport security agency creates an
expectation of lower likelihood that airplanes will be hijacked. Note that the
law modifies expectations not only for those parties to whom the law applies
(e.g., drivers in the case of the speeding law), but also for parties who are
affected by the behavior of those to whom the law applies (e.g., airline
passengers, who are affected by the risk of hijacking caused by terrorists which
the airport security law aims to deter).32
30. Cf, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 745-49 (1999) (arguing that
manufacturers have an incentive to exploit the cognitive biases of consumers); Leandra
Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorney's Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of
Lawyers'Effects on Tax Court Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1235, 1251 (2006) ("It is
also possible that attorneys could exploit clients' cognitive biases for their own ends, which
would also be a form of agency cost.").
31. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2000) (contending that expressive theories of law, in which symbolic
laws are meaningful, are not persuasive); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1504 (2000)
(claiming that much "of our existing practices of moral and legal evaluation are best understood
through expressivist perspectives").
32. This analysis holds true not only for the enactment of new laws, but also for the
enforcement of existing laws. Law enforcement affects perceptions, not only of those subject
(or potentially subject) to enforcement, but also perceptions of the general public. For example,
a Chinese court recently sentenced to death the former head of the Chinese food and drug
regulator for taking bribes to approve medicines. Geoff Dyer, Former Beijing Regulator Given
Death Sentence, FIN. TIMES, May 30, 2007, at 3. An analyst of Chinese politics said that "the
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In a world without information asymmetries or cognitive biases, the change
caused by a law to the perception of a risk it addresses would be identical to the
change in the actual risk. In other words, if a law reduces a given risk by 10%, it
would cause a reduction of 10% in the perceived risk. However, both
information asymmetries and cognitive biases frequently cause misperceptions of
the effects of a law.
Some misperceptions are coincidental, occurring for the same large variety
of reasons that cause the public to misperceive risks (as discussed in Part II,
above). But other misperceptions are the result of manipulation of cognitive
biases by the politicians who sponsor the laws.33 The politician receives credit
(and votes) by creating the perception that the law she sponsored significantly
addressed a risk that concerned her constituents. A politician who is better at
manipulating public perceptions to over-estimate the benefits of the laws she
sponsors will be more successful than her rivals, all things being equal. Such
manipulations take many forms, including but not limited to, the way a law is
named,34 the way it is presented to the public (e.g., facilitating a tax cut by
sentence was aimed.., at the domestic audience. .. . 'They are trying to tell people that the
situation is under control and signaling to elements of the bureaucracy to get in line."' Id. The
dramatic enforcement of the law (death sentence) had dual but separate effects on the perception
of potential perpetrators, "signaling... the bureaucracy to get in line" and "tell[ing] people that
the situation is under control." Id.
33. Biases may be in some respects more attractive for a politician to exploit than
information asymmetries because it may be harder to prove that one presented information in a
manner that induced a bias than to prove that one provided false information or failed to provide
information. Such difficulties in detection hinder the ability to prohibit or punish intentional
exploitation of biases, compared to the exploitation of information asymmetries.
34. In an example that does not seem to involve bias arbitrage, in November 2003,
President Bush signed into law an act that changed the name of a swamp from "Congaree
Swamp National Monument" to "Congaree National Park." See Pub. L. No. 108-108, tit. I,
§ 135, 117 Stat. 1241 ("Upon enactment of this Act, the Congaree Swamp National Monument
shall be designated Congaree National Park."). Within four months of the name change, and
apparently due to it, the number of monthly visitors more than doubled. See Andrew Jacobs,
Park is Still a Swamp, but Please Don't Tell the Tourists, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2004, at A14
(reporting that attendance at the park doubled following the name change).
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sending checks to taxpayers),35 or simply by the use of the media to create social
amplification of the politician's message.36
For example, suppose that the probability of hijacking an airplane is 0.00 1%
(1-in-i 00,000), but following the tragic events of September 11,2001, the public
misperceives the risk to be 1%. At a 1% probability of hijacking, few people fly.
Sensing a risk misperception that creates an opportunity for bias arbitrage, a
politician sponsors a law to institute airport security. Suppose that the
implementation of this law has the effect of reducing the likelihood of hijacking
by 50% (to 1-in-200,000). Suppose also that the politician is modest and
"undersells" the law, so that the public perceives the law to have no effect. The
result is the public still believing that the probability of hijacking is 1% and a
continued pattern of few people flying, thus significantly reducing the actual
benefits of the law. In such a case, the politician herself receives no credit for her
work.
If the politician were not modest, but merely honest, and persuaded the
public that the law would reduce hijacking by 50% (as it indeed does), then the
public would perceive the probability as 0.5%, still a lethal risk that would deter
most air travelers. The politician would receive some credit for her efforts, but
because most travelers are still deterred from flying, the credit due the politician
would be as limited as the act's effect in increasing air travel.
Suppose, instead, that the politician persuasively overstates the effects of the
law, convincing her constituents that the law she sponsored reduces the
probability of hijacking by 99%. To a public that expects (prior to the law's
implementation) a hijacking probability of 1%, the law's effect would be to
reduce the perceived probability to 1-in-10,000. While the public would still
over-estimate the likelihood of hijacking by a full order of magnitude, this
reduced probability would likely result in a significant increase in air travel.
Individuals who are skeptical of the politician's claims (and still believe that the
probability is 1%) may refrain from flying, but as they observe others fly, they
would notice that far less than 1% of airplanes are hijacked, supporting the
35. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), signed into law on
June 7, 2001, entitled taxpayers to a rebate of between $300-$600. To make the tax cut even
more vivid, the Department of Treasury was instructed to mail a check for this rebate to each
taxpayer. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, The Check is in the Mail (July 20, 2001),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po495.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2007) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Such vivid, tangible presentation may have made
the tax cut's effect on individual taxpayers' finances seem greater than a discussion of
aggregate, non-tangible figures.
36. See Aviram, Placebo Effects, supra note 8, at 76 (noting that media can cause social
amplification and therefore the public overestimates a risk).
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politician's claim of a probability of 1-in-10,000." Thus, even some of the
skeptics are likely to eventually credit the law (and the politician who
sponsored the law) for the "reduced" risk of hijacking. Beyond the private
benefit to the politician, persuasively overstating the law's effects improved
social welfare in this hypothetical because the perceived probability of
hijacking now more closely approximates the actual probability, resulting in
less excessive avoidance of air travel.
This example points out why the opportunity for bias arbitrage affects a
politician's choice of what risk to address. Politicians may gain electoral
benefit from promoting a law addressing a correctly perceived risk with a
solution that actually reduces risk. However, there would be some uncertainty
as to whether the solution would work, and even if it did, objective solutions
may reduce an actual risk more modestly than cognitive biases inflate perceived
risks. In our airplane hijacking hypothetical, the objective solution reduced the
probability of hijacking by 50%, so if (counter to the hypothetical's
assumptions) the public correctly estimated the risk of hijacking and the law's
effects on that risk, the politician would be credited with reducing the risk to
50% of its previous level. Instead, in our hypothetical, the politician is credited
with reducing the risk fifty times more, to 1% of its previous level.
Addressing a risk that is correctly perceived would also cause
"overselling" the law to have adverse results, both to the politician and to social
welfare. If, in our hijacking hypothetical, the actual probability of hijacking
was identical to the probability perceived by the public (1%), and the politician
successfully persuaded her constituents that the law reduced the probability by
99% (to 1 -in- 10,000), while it in fact reduced the objective probability by only
50% (to 1-in-200), then the public would fly excessively, unwittingly over-
exposing itself to the risk of hijacking. In addition, over time the public will
observe that airplanes are hijacked more frequently than 1-in-10,000. When
notice of this spreads, the politician will face electoral harm and her credibility
will suffer, reducing her ability to receive credit for future laws. Therefore,
laws that address risks that are over-estimated are likely to offer higher
expected payoffs to the politician and pose less risk from "overselling" than
laws that address correctly estimated risks. A rational politician may choose to
address an over-estimated risk that has less effective objective solutions over a
correctly estimated risk (or an under-estimated risk) that has more effective
objective solutions.
37. The actual proportion of hijacked flights would be, per our assumptions, 1-in-
200,000.
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One does not need to be cynical about politicians' motives to expect them
to invoke legal placebo effects by choosing to address risks that are over-
estimated and then overselling the laws that they sponsor. A politician who has
the public's interests in mind may recognize that she must be responsive to the
public's concerns (ill-founded as such concerns may be) or she would not
remain in office to implement policies that she believes necessary.
Returning again to the hijacking hypothetical, assume that the public
misperceived the 1-in-100,000 probability of hijacking to be 1%. Assume also
that no action can immediately prevent future hijackings, but that an effective
course of action would take three years to implement. During these three years,
the public would continue to believe that the risk of hijacking is much higher
than it actually is and refrain from flying. For many people and businesses, a
three-year period without air transportation would be highly disruptive. A
politician who bluntly claims that her solution would take three years to
implement is likely to lose an election to a rival who promises an alternative
solution that would immediately reduce the probability of hijacking to 1-in-
100,000. Because this is the actual probability of the risk, a law dealing with
hijacking need not have any objective effects to "succeed" (though if the law
also reduced the actual risk of hijacking-all the better). The well-intentioned
politician may use the time bought by this law to implement the three-year
solution, which would reduce the actual risk of hijacking to the lowest feasible
level.38
Just as well-meaning politicians may intentionally enact laws with placebo
effects, so might well-meaning politicians unintentionally create placebo effects
by overselling the laws they sponsor. Politicians, like any other person, are
susceptible to the illusion of control, which causes over-optimism regarding
events whose outcome depends partially on the individual's skill and partially
on other circumstances. 3 9 Having applied her skill in identifying and crafting a
solution to mitigate a risk, the politician is likely to exhibit over-optimism about
the solution's effectiveness.40 In addition, facing the task of persuading the
38. Naturally, the private gains to the politician from implementing the three-year plan
would be low because the public would no longer be as concerned about hijacking if they
correctly perceive the probability to be 1-in- 100,000. The reduced pressure from the public and
resulting reduction in implementation of objective solutions to the risk is not necessarily
lamentable. If the public is over-estimating the risk, then the pressure it puts on the politicians
is excessive.
39. See Langer, supra note 24, at 313 ("An illusion of control is defined as expectancy of
a personal success probability higher than the objective probability would warrant.").
40. See, e.g., Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information
Sharing, 55 ALA. L. REv. 231, 254-57 (2004) (noting that when outcomes depend on a mixture
of skill and chance, decision makers are likely to overestimate their ability to control chance
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public of the law's expected effects, even the honest politician may fall prey to
a self-serving bias and genuinely over-estimate the law's positive effects. 4'
Thus, politicians engage in bias arbitrage, sometimes intentionally, for either self-
serving or altruistic purposes, and sometime unwittingly, due to biased over-estimation
of the effects of a law they devise and sponsor. To the politician engaging in bias
arbitrage, the law is a vehicle through which placebo effects are administered (just as a
sugar pill is the vehicle through which a medical placebo is administered).
Bias arbitrage is a form of counter-biasing, not debiasing.42 In other words, it• • 43
does not address and eliminate the bias that created the risk misperception. Rather, it
creates a new bias that is aimed to offset the original bias. Because the causes of the
original bias are not addressed and because counter-biasing may overcorrect, or
conversely, fail to fully offset the original bias, from a social welfare perspective bias,
arbitrage is a second best solution. In ideal conditions, debiasing would be preferable.
However, debiasing is often costly, impractical, and less likely to be employed because
it frequently lacks the private incentives that bias arbitrage offers to those that engage
in it.
44
Law serves as a means to bias arbitrage, and so does the risk that the law
addresses. A politician must select on which issue (or, differently put, which
risk) to focus. Several considerations may influence her decision, but one of
the most powerful considerations-largely ignored by the literature-would be
the risk's potential for arbitrage (i.e., the existence of a perception gap-a
discrepancy between the actual and perceived risk). Indeed, if they do not
readily find a suitable risk, politicians may venture to generate a perception gap
in a correctly perceived risk in order to create opportunity for bias arbitrage. 45
By identifying an over-estimated risk and conspicuously sponsoring legislation
or law enforcement that addresses the risk, the politician can claim credit for
events).
41. One form of self-serving bias affects predictions (i.e., that an individual believes that a
desired outcome is more likely to occur than an undesirable outcome). See, e.g., Linda Babcock
et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 1337, 1341 (1995)
(finding that a self-serving estimate of fairness affected predictions of a hypothetical judge's
award).
42. On the use of law to debias, see Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through
Law, 35 J. LEG. STUD. 199, 200 (2006).
43. See id. (defining debiasing through the law as when legal policy acts "directly on the
boundedly rational and attempts to help people to either reduce or eliminate" problems as
opposed to merely insulating them from negative outcomes).
44. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism,
73 U. CHI. L. REv. 207, 221 (2006) (describing costs of debiasing).
45. See infra Part V.B (discussing methods by which politicians create opportunity for
bias arbitrage).
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more than the law's objective effect on the risk, without ever losing credibility
for that claim. Because it does not erode a politician's credibility, bias arbitrage
is unlike other forms of politicians' "puffery."46
B. Standing Above the Biases?
The bias arbitrageur identifies risk misperceptions caused by biases. But
why is she not blinded by those same biases?
Bias arbitrage is possible despite an arbitrageur's susceptibility to biases.
Individuals vary in their susceptibility to cognitive biases (or, put differently, in
their ability to debias themselves).47 Bias arbitrage is typically a more certain
and less costly way for a politician to create a perception of effectiveness than
addressing a correctly perceived risk. Politicians who are able to effectively
engage in bias arbitrage would be, ceteris paribus, more successful than their
rivals and, through competition, would more likely survive in politics. The
average surviving politician is likely to have better than average ability to
debias herself in perceiving risks in the areas in which she focuses her political
activity.
The politician does not have to be less susceptible to all biases in order to
be an effective bias arbitrageur. Politicians specialize, and become known for
activity in certain areas (e.g., expertise in defense, foreign relations,
government ethics/campaign finance, economic policy, etc.). If a politician has
a superior ability to debias her risk perception in a certain area (e.g., correctly
perceive the risk of war), she can engage in bias arbitrage in that area, even if
she is prone to biases in other areas (e.g., prone to biases causing her to over-
estimate the prevalence and severity of corporate fraud), which would preclude
her from engaging in bias arbitrage in these other areas. A politician's good
judgment in her area of specialization includes not only her knowledge, but also
her resistance to the biases that most affect that area. The latter affects her
ability to engage in bias arbitrage.
46. If a politician "oversold" the effectiveness of a law addressing a correctly perceived
risk, people would eventually notice that the risk is greater than the politician claimed and the
politician's credibility would ultimately suffer.
47. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie & Jeffirey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment and
Litigation, 59 VAND. L. REv. 2017, 2047 (2006) (suggesting that insurance claim adjusters are
less susceptible to some cognitive biases than the general population); Rachlinski, supra note
44, at 216-24 (explaining factors leading to variance in susceptibility to cognitive biases). For
the purposes of this Article, I use "resistance to/susceptibility to cognitive bias" and "ability to
self-debias" interchangeably.
BIAS ARBITRAGE
The politician need not know the areas in which she has better resistance
to biases. Experience will teach her in which areas she misjudged risk, and
competition between politicians would force her to reposition herself as active
in another area of political debate, or lose prominence to rivals who have
superior debiasing abilities regarding these risks.
Even bias-resistant politicians are not wholly unbiased. Yet despite facing
some probability of misidentifying a perception gap (and therefore launching a
failed attempt to bias arbitrage), they are likely to attempt arbitrage. Politicians
are entrepreneurs and advance their careers by identifying issues that the
public---or interest groups within it-wants addressed and remedying them.
Like all entrepreneurs, they face a risk of failure, either because they identified
the wrong issue, or because they advanced the wrong remedy. The risk of
failure in itself does not determine whether bias arbitrage takes place. Rather, it
is the relative risk of failure from engaging in bias arbitrage compared to the
risk of failure from pursuing an issue that seems more correctly perceived by
the public. As long as bias arbitrage offers politicians the possibility of
receiving "free credit" for a reduction in an over-estimated risk, politicians are
likely to attempt it, despite the risk of failure caused by their own susceptibility
to biases. Through an evolutionary process of competition, the less bias-
susceptible of these entrepreneurs are likely to prevail.
C. Social Welfare Effects of Laws with Placebo Effects
Bias arbitrage creates private benefits to the arbitrageur but also impacts
the public's perception gap (the discrepancy between the actual and perceived
risk) and thus affects social welfare.48 I now turn to discuss when placebo
effects are laudable for enhancing social welfare and when they are lamentable
because they reduce social welfare.
Individuals respond to risk in two ways: avoiding the risk, or, if avoidance
is not feasible, expending resources to confront the risk.49 Recall the example
of the excessive perception of crime in New Orleans following Hurricane
Katrina. 50 Responding to a perceived dramatic increase in crime, some police
officers in New Orleans and its surroundings resigned to avoid exposure to the
48. See Aviram, Placebo Effects, supra note 8, at 92 (noting that placebo effects, which
are one method to extract private benefits from perception gaps, can have both positive and
negative effects on social welfare).
49. See id. at 66-67 (describing risk avoidance and mitigation of investors in the context
of a law to punish corporate fraud).
50. See supra Part II.
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risk.5 Meanwhile, some of New Orleans' residents brandished guns and
patrolled their property, thereby confronting the risk.
52
Both activity avoidance and confrontation are costly, though either may be
efficient if it is the least costly method for avoiding more costly harm from the
risk. Absent information asymmetry and cognitive biases, an individual's
decision to avoid or confront a risk should be efficient from the perspective of
social welfare. 53 However, as we have seen in the New Orleans example,
cognitive biases cause misperceptions of risk. When perceived risk exceeds
actual risk, individuals excessively avoid or confront the risk, imposing
unnecessary costs on themselves and others. 54 When perceived risk is lower
than actual risk, individuals insufficiently avoid or confront the risk, imposing
on themselves or others the cost of a higher probability of harm.
Looking to the airplane hijacking hypothetical,5 5 if the objective
probability of a hijacking is 1-in-100,000, but the public perceives the
probability as 1%, then most individuals would avoid flying, either staying put
and losing the benefit of reaching their intended destination, or substituting
another method of transportation and bearing the higher actual risk of
accidents. 56 On the other hand, if the actual probability of hijacking was 1%,
51. See Dwyer & Drew, supra note 16, at Al (describing how exaggerated rumors of
crime affected police response in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina).
52. See Felicity Barringer & Jere Longman, Owners Take Up Arms as Looters Press Their
Advantage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A16 ("Many people with property brought out their
own shotguns and sidearms.").
53. An implicit assumption in this statement is that that any externalities of the decision
whether to avoid or confront the risk are internalized. For example, the decision of a police
officer to resign has externalities on the welfare of the population that lives in the area in which
the officer serves. This externality existed before a crisis formed and was internalized through
payment of a salary to the officer. Changes in the perceived risk may destabilize internalization
mechanisms (e.g., a police officer's salary would no longer compensate for the officer's
heightened perceived risk), though internalization mechanisms can and often are designed with
this eventuality in mind (e.g., severe sanctions for soldiers refusing orders during battle;
hazardous duty bonuses, etc.).
54. Risk confrontation may internalize costs on others just as risk avoidance does. For
example, heightened perception of risk of crime in New Orleans may cause a property owner
who is patrolling his property to misperceive another's actions as hostile and attack that person.
As with externalities of risk avoidance, there are internalization mechanisms (e.g., criminal law,
tort law), and as with risk avoidance, these mechanisms sometimes become destabilized due to
changes in perceived risk.
55. See supra Part III.A.
56. Automobile transportation is generally considered riskier than air transportation. See,
e.g., Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyali & Daniel H. Simon, The Impact of 9/11 on Road
Fatalities: The Other Lives Lost to Terrorism 1 ( Feb. 10, 2005) (unpublished working paper,
on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), available at http://www.news.
cornell.edu/stories/March05/Septl I driving.pdf (claiming that at least 1,200 additional driving
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but cognitive biases caused the population to perceive the probability as 1-in-
100,000, then too many people would fly and be hijacked.
The loss of social welfare, from excessive or insufficient risk avoidance or
confrontation, increases as the gap between actual and perceived risk grows.
Placebo effects may mitigate, or exacerbate, this gap. A placebo effect is a
product of cognitive bias and information asymmetry, which causes an
individual to perceive the effect of a law on a risk differently from the actual
effect of the law.57 The law, therefore, serves as a vehicle that introduces
change to the actual risk, the perceived risk, or both, affecting the gap between
actual and perceived risk.
Over time, people can debias themselves without the aid of a placebo
effect as they track the occurrence of the risk and adjust their perceptions to
what they observe. However, placebo effects speed the process and, therefore,
reduce the amount of time during which the misperception of a risk causes a
reduction in social welfare.
The direction of the placebo effect, relative to the direction of the bias,
determines whether the placebo effect has a positive or negative impact on
social welfare. If the placebo effect applies in the same direction as the risk
misperception that existed prior to enacting the law, then the placebo effect
exacerbates the gap between perceived and actual risk and will reduce social
welfare. 58 For example, suppose that the public under-estimates the risk posed
by traffic accidents (say, the actual probability is 1%, but the perceived
probability is 0.8%), and government enacts a law that mandates
implementation of safety features in cars. Suppose also that the law reduces the
actual probability of car accidents by 10% (to 0.9%), but the politician who
sponsors the law "oversells" it and causes the public to expect the probability to
drop by 50%, making perceived probability 0.4%. Despite the reduction in the
actual probability, the gap between actual and perceived probabilities has
widened from 0.2% to 0.5%. As a result, safety precautions in driving (and
avoiding driving), which were already insufficient prior to the law, will be even
less sufficient after enacting the law. The reduction of 0.1% in the probability
of car accidents will have a positive effect on social welfare, but the placebo
effect-that is the reduction in safety precautions that results from more than
deaths are attributable to the September 11 th attacks because the attacks caused individuals to
switch their travel plans from flying to driving).
57. See Aviram, Placebo Effects, supra note 8, at 70 ("The placebo effect of law mitigates
the discrepancy between actual and perceived probabilities and thus captures some of the social
welfare lost because of this discrepancy.").
58. See id. at 93 (describing how negative placebo effects reduce social welfare).
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doubling the gap between the actual and perceived probabilities of car
accidents-will reduce social welfare. 59
On the other hand, if the placebo effect applies in the opposite direction
from the risk misperception that existed prior to enacting the law, then the
placebo effect mitigates the gap between perceived and actual risk and will
increase social welfare.60  Returning to our example of airplane hijacking,
assume that the public over-estimates the risk posed from hijacking, the
probability of which is actually 1-in-100,000, but is perceived to be 1%.
Assume also that a politician sponsors a law that reduces the actual probability
by 50% but is perceived by the public to reduce the probability by 99% .61
After enacting the law, the actual probability is 0.0005%, while the perceived
probability is 0.01%. Prior to the law, the gap had been 0.999%; after enacting
the law, the gap has narrowed to 0.0095%. As a result, avoidance of flying,
which had been very excessive, is less excessive now. This utility accumulates
with the benefits of reducing the actual probability of hijacking. Both increase
social welfare.
59. This effect may seem like a form of moral hazard, but it is not. I explain in detail the
difference between this effect (called negative placebo effect) and moral hazard in Aviram,
Placebo Effects, supra note 8, at Part V.B. Because this Article focuses on bias arbitrage rather
than legal placebo effects, I will not address this issue here.
60. There is an exception to this statement, when the misperception caused by the law
"overshoots" the prior misperception. For example, suppose that prior to enacting a law, the
public only moderately misperceived the risk of hijacking (e.g., perceived it to be 1-in-75,000
when it was actually 1-in- 100,000). Suppose also that the law reduced the objective probability
by 50%, but the public was persuaded that the risk was reduced by 99% (so the objective
probability is I -in-200,000, and the perceived probability is 1 -in-7,500,000). Prior to enacting
the law, there was an over-estimation gap of approximately 0.00033%; now there is an under-
estimation gap of 0.00048%. Thus, the public is more over-optimistic about the risk after the
law, than it was over-pessimistic about the risk prior to the law. If risk avoidance and
confrontation expenditures are symmetrical for over-optimism and over-pessimism, then we
expect a greater cost from insufficient avoidance/confrontation after enacting the law than the
cost from excessive avoidance/confrontation prior to enacting the law. This pattern of
"overshooting" is likely to be relatively rare, however, because (as explained in Part III.A)
politicians have a strong incentive to sponsor laws addressing risks that are grossly
misperceived, and overshooting is unlikely to happen when the original misperception is severe.
61. To be clear, "overselling" a law means that in absolute terms, the law reduces the
perceived risk probability more than the actual risk probability. Thus, a law may be "oversold"
even if (unlike in this example) the claimed percentage of risk reduction (in this example, 99%)
is smaller than the actual percent of risk reduction (in this example, 50%), as long as in absolute
terms the claimed risk reduction is greater than the actual risk reduction. Applied to the above
example, if the law reduced the objective probability by 50% (to 0.0005%, a reduction of
0.0005%), but the politician only claimed the law would reduce the risk by 40% (to 0.6%, a
reduction of 0.4%), she would still oversell the law, since in absolute terms the law reduced the
perceived risk by 0.4% and the actual risk by only 0.0005%). When a risk is extremely over-
estimated, the change in the actual risk may barely affect the change in the perception gap
because even small changes in the (much larger) perceived risk will be greater in magnitude.
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As these examples demonstrate, there is more than one type of placebo
effect. In fact, there are four types, divided by two criteria: (i) the pre-existing
bias-whether prior to enacting the law, the public over- or under-estimated the
risk later addressed by the law; and (ii) the placebo's impact on risk
perception-whether the public over- or under-estimated the effect of the law
in reducing the risk.62 The four types of placebo effects are presented in the
following figure:
I P la c e bo +
Public under-estimates
law's reduction of risk
Bias_ I  Positive Negative Bias +
Anti-Placebo Anti-Placebo
Public _A Effects Effects Public
under-estimates ' N P v over-estimates
rikNegative Positive rsrisk Placebo Placebo risk
Effects Effects
Public over-estimates
law's reduction of risk
Placebo -
The hijacking hypothetical falls into the category of "positive placebo
effects., 63 The public over-estimated the risk of hijacking prior to the law's
enactment, and over-estimated the effect of the law in reducing the same risk.
As explained above, the misperception caused by the law runs counter to the
misperception that existed prior to the law. As a result, the gap between actual
and perceived risk was reduced, and social welfare increased.
The car accident hypothetical falls into the category of "negative placebo
effects." The public under-estimated the risk of car accidents prior to the law's
enactment, and over-estimated the effect of the law in reducing the same risk.
As explained above, the misperception caused by the law was in the same
62. For a more detailed analysis of they types of placebo effects see Aviram, Placebo
Effect, supra note 8, at 92-102.
63. The use of "positive" and "negative" in classifying placebo effects refers to their
impact on social welfare.
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direction as the misperception that existed prior to the law. Therefore the law
exacerbated the misperception, reducing social welfare. One expects negative
placebo effects to be less common than their positive counterparts because
politicians have less to gain from addressing risks that are under-estimated.
The over-optimistic public would be less concerned with the risk, making it less
attractive for the politician to address. If the risk is addressed by a law and the
politician manages to "oversell" the law's effects, it will widen the gap between
the law's actual effects and its perceived effects. Over time, this gap will likely
be noticed, and the politician's credibility would suffer.
64
The other two effects are a result of a misperception that under-estimates
the law's effect in reducing the risk it addresses. I call them anti-placebo
effects because they are akin to a perverse experiment in which a patient is told
that she is taking poison rather than medicine, though objectively the pill she
takes is benevolent or benign. If normal placebo experiments demonstrate a
positive effect on the patient's health merely by her thinking that she is taking
medicine, one would expect the opposite, negative effect on the patient's health
if she thought she is taking a harmful substance. Of course, this is why such
experiments are not done in the realm of medicine.
It may not be obvious at first blush that anti-placebo effects play a role in
the legal realm. Why would the public under-estimate a law's effect in dealing
with the risk it was designed to address? Politicians have the incentive to take
credit for their initiatives, and successful politicians are likely to have skill in
persuading the public of the effectiveness of their initiatives. Furthermore, due
to their own cognitive biases, politicians are likely to genuinely over-estimate
the effectiveness of their laws.
However, in some circumstances, the effectiveness of laws is under-
estimated, and laws may even be perceived to increase certain risks.6 5 This may
occur when politicians must make a trade-off between the interests of several
groups. They may benefit one group (or reduce a risk that concerns it) at the
cost of increasing a risk to another group. For example, government may
attempt to use eminent domain to solve hold-out problems and facilitate
economic development. The purpose of the law is to address economic
stagnation or decline. To others who perceive their property as similarly
64. In the car accident example, the public will expect a 0.4% probability of car accidents
because of the politician's promise that the law will reduce accidents by 50%. Overtime, as the
public gradually observes that the actual rate of car accidents is 0.9% (higher than the perceived
probability prior to enacting the law), the politician's credibility would be put to question, and
the law may be (wrongly) perceived to have increased the actual risk of car accidents.
65. See Aviram, Placebo Effects, supra note 8, at 98-102 (discussing the "anti-placebo
effects" of laws that increase perceived risks).
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situated, however, the law may also increase the perceived risk of future
confiscation. If the effects of government's action on each of these risks are
misperceived, those individuals who are concerned about their community's
economic decline may experience a placebo effect, 66 while those who are
concerned about their property's vulnerability to confiscation may experience
an anti-placebo effect.67
Anti-placebo effects may also occur in situations in which a segment of
the population is ignorant of a law, and therefore, the law does not affect this
segment's perceived risk, though it does affect the actual risk. If such a law
reduces the actual risk, then it creates an anti-placebo effect because its effects
were under-estimated-the individuals ignorant of the law perceived an effect
of zero, while the law had in fact reduced the actual risk.68
Finally, an effect similar to an anti-placebo effect occurs when parties who
are interested in engaging in bias arbitrage attempt to create or expand a gap
between perceived and actual risk, which they could later exploit. These
parties may act in ways that increase the perception of risk, while (unlike the
bias arbitrage process) trying not to have the increase in risk perception be
attributable to them. I will discuss this type of behavior in Part V.B below.
D. Bias Arbitrage and the Literature on Symbolic Legislation
As explained above, law is a vehicle for politicians to engage in bias
arbitrage. In Part IV of this Article, I will discuss extra-legal methods of bias
arbitrage that may compete with law. Before moving to address these extra-
legal methods, a few words are necessary to describe the relationship between
the concept of bias arbitrage, which uses law to create placebo effects, and the
concept of symbolic legislation.
Scholars have long ago noted that law has, beyond its effects on
individuals' incentives, communicative and expressive functions.69  For
example, Wibren Van Der Burg described the communicative function of law
66. Whether this would be a positive or negative placebo effect depends on the
misperception (if any) of the risk prior to government's action.
67. Some people may be concerned with both risks, and therefore be affected by both a
placebo and an anti-placebo effect, each addressing a different risk.
68. For further development of this idea, see Amitai Aviram, The Hidden Effect of
Ignorance of the Law (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
69. See generally MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964); ERIC A.
POSNER, LAW AND SocIALNoRMs (2000); Robert C. Ellickson, The Marketfor Social Norms, 3
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2001); Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation
of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
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as providing a framework of standards for citizens to interpret and live up to,
and the expressive function as embodying the "shared values which are
connected with the identity of a political community. '' 0 More closely related
with the concept of bias arbitrage, some scholars noted the role of law in
providing assurance through the use of symbols.71 The study of symbolism in
politics was pioneered by Murray Edelman, who argued that a principal
function of many forms of political participation is to provide symbolic
reassurance to the public.72 The law functions "as symbolizing the public
affirmation of social ideals and norms as well as a means of direct social
control" that could influence behavior unrelated to law's enforcement
function.73 Applied to legislation, "symbolic legislation serves the needs of the
public by indicating that Congress is 'doing something' about a perceived
problem ....",7 In other words, symbolic legislation is unconcerned with
enforcement because in "analyzing law as symbolic we are oriented less to
behavioral consequences as a means to a fixed end; more to meaning as an act,
a decision, a gesture important in itself."
7 5
Some legal scholars drew on the concept of symbolic legislation,
particularly in tax and environmental law.76 Though the literature recognized
70. Wibren Van Der Burg, The Expressive and Communicative Functions of Law,
Especially with Regard to Moral Issues, 20 L. & PHIL. 31, 39-41 (2001).
71. See Helgi Gunnlaugsson & John F. Galliher, Prohibition of Beer in Iceland: An
International Test of Symbolic Politics, 20 LAW& Soc'Y REv. 335,336 (1986) (describing how
unenforceable antitrust legislation serves the instrumental purpose of "reassuring an angry
public that past abuses of business leaders were no longer possible" while also serving a
symbolic function).
72. See EDELMAN, supra note 69, at 4 ("Not only does systematic research suggest that the
most cherished forms of popular participation in government are largely symbolic, but also that
many of the public programs universally taught and believed to benefit a mass public in fact
benefit relatively small groups.").
73. Joseph R. Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of
Deviance, 15 Soc. PROBS. 175, 177 (1967).
74. Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols,
Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L.
REv. 863, 921 (2004).
75. Gusfield, supra note 73, at 177.
76. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q.
233, 234 (1990) ("The most significant problem with symbolic legislation, however, is not
delay; it is the resulting distortions in the regulatory process."); Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers
ofSymbolic Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-ProofRules, 84 IOWA
L. REv. 413, 446-58 (1999) (noting, using the tax context as an example, that symbolic
legislation, though devoid of meaning, may be politically expedient or even necessary); Michael
S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The Tension Between
Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REv. 475,
507-16 (2005) (discussing the symbolic effect of Congress' response to corporate
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the assurances that many laws provided to the public, it failed to recognize the
potential positive impact on social welfare. Most of the scholarship on
symbolic legislation treats it as a smoke screen that distracts the public and
displaces legislation that could enhance social welfare. One scholar
apocalyptically wrote: "The enactment of symbolic legislation reflects a
breakdown of the legislative policymaking machinery, a system that all too
frequently addresses real social problems in an unrealistic fashion. 7 7 Under
this view, symbolic legislation at the "societal macro-level" is "societal self-
deception and an instrument for managing rather than resolving... problems"
while on the "micro-level" as a "self-deception of individuals who are
psychologically divided between supporting meaningful... policies and
worrying about the costs which such policies might entail. 7 8
While there can be abuse through the manipulation of perceived risk, an
issue addressed in Part V.B, bias arbitrage is no more susceptible to abuse than
any other governmental action. Though imperfect, the same mechanisms that
mitigate other governmental abuses also limit the ability of politicians to solely
engage in bias arbitrage. More importantly, the legal scholarship on symbolic
legislation fails to note the actual, welfare-enhancing impact that bias arbitrage
has in situations in which the public over-estimates a risk. They examine only
what a law's assurance does to individuals' political behavior, not what the
assurance does to individuals' behavior regarding the risk that they face.
Returning to the hijacking hypothetical, passage of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA)79 would provide assurance in response to
the public's excessive avoidance of flying after September 11, 2001. Due to
the reduced perception of the risk, the public would indeed put less pressure on
politicians to further expend resources on aviation safety. However, the public
would also substitute their travel plans back to airplanes and away from cars (a
method of travel which objectively has a higher risk of injury), resulting in
expatriations); John W. Lee & W. Eugene Seago, Policy Entrepreneurship, Public Choice, and
Symbolic Reform Analysis of Section 198, The Brownfields Tax Incentive: Carrot or Stick or
Just Never Mind?, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 613, 620-21 (2002) (arguing that
limitations imposed on the Clinton Administration's brownfields tax incentive rendered it
largely symbolic).
77. Dwyer, supra note 76, at 234; see also Lee & Seago, supra note 76, at 620 ("Political
science literature utilizes 'symbolism' to mean demonizing 'political enemies' in political
discourse, which tends to deflect those seeking substantive reform.").
78. Jens Newig, Symbolic Environmental Legislation and Societal Self-Deception, 16
ENVTL. POL. 276, 277 (2007).
79. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (creating the federal Transportation Security
Administration, which is responsible for security in U.S. airports).
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safer travel. 80 Furthermore, if people over-estimate a risk, then the pressure
they put on politicians to enact laws responding to those risks is itself
excessive. If bias arbitrage causes the perceived risk to more closely
approximate the actual risk, then the public's pressure on politicians to address
the risk would be at a more appropriate intensity.
A charitable view of the literature that is critical of symbolic legislation
would be that it implicitly assumes the risk perceived by the public is no higher
than the actual risk. If the public correctly estimates the risk or under-estimates
it, then a law that assures the public would exacerbate the public's unwarranted
optimism and prevent political pressure to further address the risk.8 Worse, the
assurance will cause the public to take insufficient precautions against the
risk.82 Such laws would have negative placebo effects that indeed reduce social
welfare.
8 3
The literature that is hostile to symbolic legislation does not, however,
make this assumption explicit or attempt to support it. There are reasons to
suspect that for many laws this assumption would be false. Politicians are less
likely to enact a law in an area in which the public under-estimates a risk
because such a law would not address most voters' greatest concerns and would
forgo the benefit to the politician from bias arbitrage. To appear effective and
enhance the prospects of reelection, a politician needs to address those risks
that most concern her constituents. A risk is unlikely to be under-estimated by
the constituents and at the same time be of great concern to them.
If, contrary to the implicit but unlikely assumption stated above, the risk
that concerns the public is indeed over-estimated, then bias arbitrage would
both positively affect the public's level of risk avoidance and confrontation, and
the public's level of political pressure to address the risk. Thus, much of the
hostility in the literature on symbolic legislation is unwarranted. Politicians'
own incentives often direct them to focus on symbolic legislation in
circumstances in which it is helpful, rather than harmful, to reduce the public's
perception of a risk.
80. On the effects of substituting ground transportation for air transportation, see Blalock
et al., supra note 56, at 10.
81. See Newig, supra note 78, at 286 (describing a German traffic law that resulted in no
reduction of ozone levels while turning public attention away from summer smog issues).
82. See Aviram, Placebo Effects, supra note 8, at 93 (noting that exacerbation of
unwarranted optimism will remove incentives to sufficiently avoid risks).
83. See id. ("Negative placebo effects reduce social welfare because they make the public
expose itself unnecessarily to risks (i.e. sufficiently avoid activities related to a risk).").
BIAS ARBITRAGE
IV Private Parties Engage in Bias Arbitrage
A. Private Legal Systems
Private legal systems (PLSs)-nongovemmental social institutions that
enforce norms-engage in bias arbitrage in the same manner as government
does, by identifying misperceived risks and then forming and enforcing norms
that are designed to address the misperceived risks.84 These norms are then
presented in a manner that attempts to cause an overestimation of the norm's
effect on the risk. If successful, the PLS receives credit for the reduction in the
perceived risk, while social welfare is enhanced by the convergence of actual
and perceived risks.
In the case of government, adherence to enforced norms (i.e., laws) is
mandatory and backed with government's monopoly on violence, but
individual politicians are not secure in positions of power, and must solicit the
constituents' favor (a solicitation which may be less costly when engaging in
bias arbitrage). 85 Thus, bias arbitrage is used by government not to maintain
support for its existence, but to maintain support for the individual politicians
who direct the government's actions.
In contrast, PLSs have no assurance of their existence. Adherence to
norms enforced by a PLS is voluntary and depends on the utility constituents
derive from the norm. Such utility includes carrots (benefits provided by the
PLS, such as the perceived utility to constituents from the norm being enforced)
and sticks (perceived harm inflicted on constituents expelled from the PLS).86
Both the perceived benefit from norm enforcement and the perceived harm
from expulsion depend on the perceived risk that is to be mitigated by the norm
being enforced by the PLS. Successful bias arbitrage allows the PLS to receive
84. See Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private
Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 5 (2004) (defining PLSs as "institutions that form
and enforce norms. They either replace or complement an extant public legal system ('the
law')").
85. In democratic governments, politicians are elected (or, in some positions, appointed
by elected officials) and therefore need to explicitly receive the public's approval. However,
bias arbitrage is important in nondemocratic governments as well; even a dictator would find it
much less costly to maintain his hold on power with some carrots (e.g., protecting his subjects
from risks that they perceive as significant) in addition to sticks (e.g., risk of imprisonment or
execution). Indeed, many dictators rally their subjects around protection from the often
exaggerated threat of foes. Dictators differ from their democratic counterparts, however, in their
ability to suppress competition with private bias arbitrageurs. See infra Part IV.A.
86. Cf Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L. REv. 1179, 1225-26
(2003) (describing how the culture of a network that is a PLS can prevent norm violation by
either providing benefits for compliance or punishing members for violating the norms).
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credit for reducing a perceived risk, therefore increasing the perceived benefit it
confers and the perceived harm from being expelled from the PLS. Thus, bias
arbitrage may be used by PLSs to secure the abidance of its constituents with
the norms it enforces.
In addition, many PLSs have centralized structures in which individuals
are explicitly or implicitly elected to govern the PLSs' actions.87 Such
individuals would have incentives to engage in bias arbitrage identical to those
of government's politicians. Decentralized PLSs 88 may also engage in bias
arbitrage by expanding to enforce norms regarding misperceived risks and
having these norms perceived to be more effective than they actually are.
Decentralized PLSs do not have "politicians" who can deliberately engage in
bias arbitrage, but evolutionary forces result in the survival of decentralized
PLSs that engage in bias arbitrage. PLSs that engage in bias arbitrage are more
likely to survive than PLSs that enforce correctly perceived norms and whose
norms' effects are accurately perceived. This is because the former PLSs
would likely be perceived to confer greater benefits due to receiving credit for
mitigating the over-estimated risk.
Like government, and unlike some other private bias arbitrageurs, PLSs
may credibly persuade the public that they can affect through their actions
either the probability of a risk occurring (e.g., a group that enforces, at the pain
of expulsion, a norm of not lying to another congregation member may cause
members to perceive the probability of lying to decline), or the magnitude of
the harm if the risk occurs (e.g., a group in which members commit to assist
any other member whose house was flooded may cause members to perceive
the magnitude of harm from flooding to diminish). PLSs and government each
tend to have a relative advantage compared to the other in addressing certain
risks.
For example, in the United States, government is more credible in
addressing the risk of theft than one's local religious congregation. Therefore,
one would expect to see government politicians, rather than religious officials,
engage in bias arbitrage of this risk (if it is misperceived).89 In Iraq
87. By implicit elections, I mean that there is no formal election process, but the
individuals who direct the PLSs' actions can only do so with the approval of some or all of the
PLSs' constituents.
88. See Aviram, supra note 86, at 1204-11 (describing the different structures of private
legal systems). Not all PLSs are centralized. Some are decentralized and lack formal control
structures. Id. For example, no individual has formal power to direct the PLS that causes most
people standing in a queue at a cafeteria to accept the "first in time, first in line" rule (rather
than, say, a rule dictating that the hungriest person would be first in line). Id.
89. The characteristics of massive looting make it somewhat likely to trigger cognitive
biases that cause potential victims to over-estimate its likelihood and impact. I do not have any
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immediately following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, however,
many Iraqis turned to their religious or social groups for protection against
looting by forming neighborhood watches and militias.90 If these people over-
estimated the risk of looting, leaders of the religious or social groups could gain
from bias arbitrage (while enhancing social welfare by causing the perceived
risk to more closely approximate the actual risk).
B. Insurance Providers
Some private parties cannot credibly persuade others that they are able to
reduce the magnitude of a given risk, but they can persuade that they are able to
mitigate the harm imposed by the same risk. Typically, this is done by an
insurance agreement-a commitment to reimburse a person for losses she
might incur from a risk that materializes. 9'
Insurance can close a perception gap even if the insured party does not
believe the insurer can prevent the risk from taking place because the insurance
agreement reduces the expected harm (the probability of the harm occurring
times the magnitude of the harm if it occurs) by reimbursing the harmed party.
At the same time, insuring over-estimated risks can offer private benefits to the
insurer because the insurer can charge premia based on the risk perceived by
the insured party (i.e., the insured party would agree to pay a higher premium if
the perceived risk is higher),92 while the cost to the insurer is based on the
actual risk (i.e., the insurer only pays when the harm occurs and only as much
as the harm that was actually inflicted).
Consider the following example of bias arbitrage via insurance. Suppose
that the actual probability of car theft is 0.01% (1-in-10,000), but the public
perceives it as being 1%. Also suppose that the harm to a car owner from theft
is $10,000. The expected harm to a car owner is $100 (1% probability of a
information as to whether, in the case of post-Saddam Iraq, the risk to Iraqis from looting has
been misperceived or not.
90. See, e.g., Shaila K. Dewan, After the War: Southern Iraq; Militia Trained in Iran
Controls a Tense Town, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at A12 (reporting that Majar al Kabir is
controlled by Badr Brigade, which was formed to protect the town against looters).
91. See 1 APELMAN ON INSURANCE § 1.4 (2d ed. 1996) (creating a "working definition of
insurance," for which the salient feature is risk transference).
92. This assumes that there is less than perfect competition between insurers. If there
were perfect competition, the premium each firm charged would be equal to its marginal cost,
which is related to the actual risk. However, few markets exhibit perfect competition. Also, as
will be discussed in Part V, if there are sufficiently few parties able to engage in bias arbitrage
of a given bias, they are likely to divide arbitrage opportunities among themselves rather than
compete over and sabotage one another's arbitrage opportunities.
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$10,000 harm), and at that expected harm the car owner may excessively avoid
the risk of car theft (e.g., use the car less frequently, park the car only in more
expensive or less convenient but safer locations, etc.). An insurance company
could offer to insure the car owner for $10. The car owner will gladly insure
the car, paying $10 to avoid what she perceives to be a $100 risk. Once
insured, the car owner would likely act as if the risk of car theft was
significantly mitigated, thus ceasing her excessive avoidance of car theft.
Unlike a law with a placebo effect, the insurance does not attempt to make her
believe that the car is less likely to be stolen. The harm to her with insurance
from such an event is limited to the hassle of submitting a claim and making
arrangements for the interim period until she is reimbursed or provided a
replacement vehicle. Meanwhile, the insurer has reaped a healthy profit from
this bias arbitrage: it received $10 to bear a risk that has the objective expected
cost of $1 (0.01% probability of a $10,000 cost).
Naturally, insurers can only engage in this form of bias arbitrage when
they are able to credibly mitigate the expected harm from the risk. In other
words, they would be ineffective in arbitraging risks that are incommensurable,
cannot be compensated with money, or are of such type or magnitude that the
insurer is unlikely to be solvent if they occur. Thus, insurers may have an
advantage over government and PLSs in bias arbitraging car theft, but they are
at a disadvantage exploiting misperception of risks such as nuclear attack or
serial killers.
That insurers face a disadvantage in these circumstances does not mean
that they are precluded from engaging in bias arbitrage. Insurers may yet
engage in bias arbitrage when other arbitrageurs (e.g., government and PLSs)
are unable or unwilling to address the risk. For example, Iraqi insurers are
reported to offer coverage for terrorist attacks, assassinations and explosions
caused by weapons of war and car bombs.93
Insurers may also bias arbitrage when risks are under-estimated, by
excluding or limiting coverage of under-estimated risks. Limiting coverage of
under-estimated risks reduces the cost of coverage by more than it reduces the
perceived value of the coverage to the insured party, making the exclusion
93. See Robert F. Worth, New Business Blooms in Iraq: Terror Insurance, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2006, at Al (explaining that the Iraqi Insurance Company will offer a life insurance
with a one page rider that adds coverage for explosions "caused by weapons of war and car
bombs," assassinations, and terrorist attacks). It is difficult to assess whether this is an example
of bias arbitrage. In other words, are the premia priced well above the actual risk in order to
capitalize on an excessive perceived risk? The news article suggests that such insurance costs
more than twenty times the cost of comparable life insurance in the United States. Id. I do not
have data that would suggest whether the likelihood of the death (from any cause) of the insured
person in Iraq is twenty times greater than it would be in the United States.
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profitable to the insurer.94 A possible example of this practice is the limitation
of mental health benefits in many health insurance policies. Mental illness is
frequently stigmatized and therefore people are less likely to disclose mental
illness than physical illness. 95 In addition, due to the stigma, people who suffer
from mental illness often do not acknowledge to themselves and treat their
96illness. As a result, instances of mental illness are less available and the
perceived likelihood of suffering from mental illness is likely under-
estimated.97 Many health insurance policies distinguish between physical and
mental conditions and provide more limited coverage for mental illness than for
physical illness.98
C. The Media
Bias arbitrage via law tends to be viable for situations that create positive
placebo effects, but usually not for other situations. In other words, bias
arbitrage is not feasible for the politician when ex ante the public under-
estimates the relevant risk (the negative placebo effect scenario). Insurers can
exploit under-estimated risks through exclusions and limitations of coverage,
though such actions are limited in their effect on social welfare: They prevent
the exacerbation of the perception gap, but they do not mitigate the perception
gap.99 The media thrives in situations in which under-estimated risks are
exposed, acting in ways that increase individuals' risk perception and therefore
close their perception gaps.
The media gains prestige and credibility by bringing to the public's
attention unknown or unexpected facts or assessments, often in collaboration
94. At the same time, the exclusion prevents an exacerbation of the risk misperception by
a further reduction in the perceived risk that would be caused if the risk were insured.
95. See Robert M. A. Hirschfeld et al., The National Depressive and Manic-Depressive
Association Consensus Statement on the Undertreatment of Depression, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
333, 334, 337 (1997) (noting that those suffering from mental illness tend to be undertreated
and stigma is sometimes a factor).
96. See id. at 337 (describing the factors that lead a patient not to seek treatment for
depression).
97. See id. at 334 (noting that depression is vastly undertreated).
98. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 273-79 (2003) (examining the
treatment of claims for mental health problems by insurance companies).
99. To mitigate the perception gap in an under-estimated risk, the insurer would need to
increase the perceived risk, not just exclude coverage that would have reduced the perceived
risk. This would be unwelcome, however, by the insured parties who turn to the insurer to
reduce, not increase, their risk.
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with experts.'00 Misperceived risks are fertile ground for an expert to research
and testify on or for a reporter to expose. While an insurer's benefit from bias
arbitrage is (directly) pecuniary and a politician's benefit is electoral, the
benefit to the media is receiving the public's attention and respect-and
through that benefit, pecuniary benefits.' 0 '
To illustrate the media engaging in bias arbitrage, suppose that the public
is over-optimistic about the risk of avian flu; the actual probability of an
epidemic is 1%, but the public perceives the probability as 0.001% (or,
alternatively, the public misperceives the disease's magnitude to be negligible,
as severe as a common cold, though the disease is in fact deadly). An expert
can testify about her research and announce that the disease is more likely or
more severe than previously thought. The media will publicize (and probably
dramatize) the expert's findings. As with bias arbitrage by politicians, some
people will take the testimony at face value and some will be skeptical but track
the risk to compare it with the expert's prediction. The expert and the media
will gain credibility when the skeptics find that the expert's assessment is more
accurate than the previous commonly-held belief.
As with politicians and insurers, bias arbitrage influences the media's
choices of issues to engage. Grossly under-estimated risks are more attractive
to address than moderately under-estimated ones, because the media can make
more dramatic claims without overstating the risk.
The media also finds it more attractive to exacerbate under-estimated risks
than to attenuate over-estimated risks. An amusing (though fictitious) anecdote
of the media's slant towards risk exacerbation rather than attenuation comes
100. The roles of experts in bias arbitrage are strongly connected to the role of the media.
Experts often provide the credibility to the media's manipulation of perceptions. Both experts
and media then share in the private benefits of bias arbitrage.
101. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Available? Social Influences and Behavioral
Economics, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1295, 1308-09 (2003) (commenting on the effects on the media
from the terrorist attacks). The Article states:
"Whatever the criticisms, the reign of terror is boosting ratings for cable news
networks. In fact, they are now at their highest levels since the Sept. 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks. At the end of last week, Fox News Channel's average daily
audience was up 27% from a month before; CNN's was up 29%; MSNBC's, up
24%." Hence the media's coverage reflects its economic self-interest, at least in
part. Gripping instances, whether or not representative, are likely to attract
attention and to increase ratings. Often the result is to distort probability
judgments. There can be a kind of vicious circle involving the availability heuristic
and media incentives, with each aggravating the other, often to the detriment of
public understanding.
Id. Statistics in the quote are cited from Johanna Neuman, In a Sniper's Grip: Media's Role in
Drama Debated (pt. 1), L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2002, at 16.
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from the movie, "The Shipping News."'' 0 2 In this movie, the local newspaper
editor, Billy, instructs a new reporter, Quoyle, about journalism. 0 3 Billy
explains to Quoyle the importance of dramatic headlines. °4 Billy then points at
dark clouds on the horizon and asks Quoyle to describe the headline for
reporting about them.105 "Horizon Fills With Dark Clouds," tries Quoyle.
"Imminent Storm Threatens Village" responds Billy.10 6 "But what if no storm
comes?" queries Quoyle, to which Billy replies: "Village Spared From Deadly
Storm."107
One possible explanation for the media's preference for risk exacerbation
over risk attenuation is a concept that Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein named
"reputational cascade." 108 Reputational cascade is a phenomenon in which, as a
perception becomes popular, more individuals are reluctant to challenge the
perception out of fear that their reputation would be harmed if they disagree
with the consensus. 109 Sunstein quotes experts who describe the gagging effect
of reputational cascades."0 One sociologist is quoted as saying that a
researcher who doubts the health threats posed by mad-cow disease is "made to
feel like a pedophile."' 11 A medical researcher who questioned the accuracy of
some diagnoses of Lyme disease bemoaned: "Doctors can't say what they think
anymore. If you quote me as saying these things, I'm as good as dead.
' 112
Reputational cascades may explain the media's preference for risk
exacerbation over risk attenuation. As explained above, engaging in (and
profiting from) bias arbitrage requires identifying a risk that is misperceived.
For risks that are over-estimated (i.e., are currently perceived as severe), a
consensus about the severity of the risk is likely to have formed. The expert






108. See Timur Kuran & Cass Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REv. 683, 686 (1999) (describing the concept of "reputational cascades"); Timur
Kuran, Ethnic Norms and their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEG.
STuD. 623, 623 (1998) (same); Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1133-35 (same).
109. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 108, at 686 (defining the concept of reputational
cascade); see also, id. at 727-29 (noting the motivations underpinning reputational cascade).
110. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1133-34 (noting that experts sometimes avoid making
statements to avoid the opprobrium that would follow certain claims, no matter how accurate,
that defy conventional fears).
111. Id.atl133-34.
112. Id.at1133.
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who engages in risk attenuation would need to challenge this consensus, at a
risk to her reputation. 13 On the other hand, when a risk is under-estimated
(i.e., the risk is currently perceived as insignificant), a consensus is less likely to
have formed because the risk is less likely to be discussed and receive attention
if it is not considered important. In such cases, the expert who engages in risk
exacerbation does not have to challenge an existing consensus. She does not
then risk the erosion in her reputation that may occur if she confronts a
reputational cascade.
Why don't reputational cascades affect politicians, PLSs, and insurers in
the same way, causing them to avoid risk attenuation? The difference is that
politicians, PLSs, and insurers claim to take action against a risk, while the
media simply reinterprets the risk without claiming to affect it. The law
enacted by the politician, the norm enforced by the PLS, and the commitment
of the insurer to compensate each purport to reduce either the probability or the
magnitude of the risk for the public. Even if there is a consensus about the
severity of the risk, the public is likely to accept that some actions can attenuate
the risk. It may be more dubious to claim that the risk is attenuated without the
need to take action.
The media has one advantage over other bias arbitrageurs in attenuating
risk: Because it is proficient in exacerbating risk, it can enjoy a first mover
advantage in attenuating the risk it has just exacerbated. For example, an ad for
the local news may say: "Identity thief steals millions from local residents.
Tune in at 10 p.m. to learn how to protect yourself." The ad and subsequent
news report on identity theft exacerbates the perception gap while the following
report on how to protect yourself (from the now inflated risk) is a form of bias
arbitrage. Had the media not been so quick to engage in bias arbitrage, another
arbitrageur would have likely seized on the enhanced perception gap. For
example, the Federal Trade Commission could launch an enforcement initiative
against identity theft, or credit card companies could offer "fraud insurance" to
cardholders. But either of these responses takes longer than it does for the local
television station to offer its advice.
In sum, the media is disadvantaged compared to other bias arbitrageurs in
that its palette of actions that purport to attenuate risks is limited to providing
information. At the same time, its effectiveness in disseminating information
quickly makes it nimbler than other arbitrageurs in responding to perception
gaps (including those that it creates), so it has an advantage over other potential
113. See id. at 1133-34 (noting several experts who report that publicly challenging
consensus can damage credibility).
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arbitrageurs when the risk is of a type that is perceived to be reduced by the
dissemination of information to the public.
V The Market for Bias Arbitrage
A. Competition Versus Cooperation of Bias Arbitrageurs
More than one person, and usually more than one category of persons
(e.g., politicians, insurers, reporters, etc.), can engage in bias arbitrage of a
given risk. However, engaging in bias arbitrage is usually a rivalrous activity:
A's engagement in bias arbitrage of a given risk reduces the private benefits B
can reap from bias arbitraging the same risk.'
14
For example, suppose that the relevant risk is car theft in the town of
Springfield, and that the citizens of Springfield significantly over-estimate this
risk. The Springfield local government can engage in bias arbitrage by
conspicuously ordering the Springfield police to operate against car thieves. If
it operated alone, Springfield's citizens would over time observe that the
prevalence of car theft is lower than they perceived it in the past and credit the
police for the reduction in car theft. Alternatively, the local insurance company
can engage in bias arbitrage by marketing an insurance product tailored to
address any financial harm from car theft. If it operated alone, it would sell
policies at a premium that reflects the high perceived risk of car theft while
paying claims at a rate that reflects the lower actual risk. Meanwhile,
Springfield's citizens' concern with car theft would be attenuated because, if
insured, they would not bear the financial consequences of having their car
stolen.
However, if the police acted first and assured the public that its actions
were reducing the probability of car theft, then the premium the insurance
company could charge for car theft insurance would decline. Similarly, if the
insurance company acted first, then the citizens of Springfield would be less
concerned with car theft. The Springfield local government would face less
pressure to address car theft and would receive less credit for reducing this risk.
In other words, just as with other forms of arbitrage, one person's
engagement in bias arbitrage dissipates the potential benefit for others who
would engage in bias arbitrage of the same risk. As a result, competition may
take place over the ability to engage in bias arbitrage. Such competition may
114. See Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. & Robert F. Hebert, Uncertainty, Contract Costs and
Franchise Bidding, 47 S. EcON. J. 517, 518 n.3 (1980) (noting that the act of"entrepreneurs
taking advantage of disequilibrium conditions," which is arbitrage, is a rivalrous activity).
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involve positive efforts (i.e., attempting to arbitrage before another competitor
will) or negative efforts (i.e., sabotaging a competitor's bias arbitrage efforts).
Negative efforts are likely to be less common than positive efforts because
the main form of sabotage of bias arbitrage is exposing that the action has a
placebo effect." 5 Such exposure, however, may close the perception gap (and
eliminate the saboteur's bias arbitrage opportunity) without benefiting the
saboteur. It may also make the public cynical of solutions to the relevant risk,
making the success of the saboteur's bias arbitrage efforts less likely.
When competing, each potential arbitrageur has a limited palette of
vehicles it can credibly use to convey the placebo effect: legislators can enact
or amend laws; agencies and the executive branch can enforce laws
conspicuously; insurers can underwrite policies; and the media can create
newspaper, radio or television reports. Competition between them shapes how
law is created and enforced. For example, if a misperceived risk is already
addressed by an existing law, a legislator may rush to create a specific law to
bias arbitrage before a law enforcement agency does the same through
enforcement of existing law. Thus, Congress enacted a law creating a separate
crime of carjacking, even though the act of carj acking had already consisted of
a set of serious crimes, including robbery, theft, assault, and possibly
kidnapping. 16 Similarly, identity theft laws may create crimes for acts that are
already forms of theft or fraud."17 Law enforcers and courts, meanwhile, may
attempt to preempt legislators by expanding their interpretation of existing laws
and enforcing them against the misperceived risk. This competitive dynamic
may explain the growing complexity of both legislated law and the case law
and agency precedent that interprets it. Of course, when law complexity itself
115. For example, suppose that the public over-estimates the risk of terrorism, and
politician A enacts a law to increase security (over-selling its effects so as to bias arbitrage).
Rival politician B can call A's bluff and say that A's law does nothing (or not much) to reduce
terrorism. This would likely be a poor strategy because, if indeed the public over-estimates the
risk of terrorism and they hear A claiming that the risk will decline and B claiming that it will
not, they would sway towards A and against B when they see over time that the risk of terrorism
is lower than they originally perceived (presumably, they would think, because ofA's law). B's
credibility will suffer even if she is right in claiming A's actions are ineffective. Alternatively, B
can engage in a conspicuous action that purports to reduce terrorism (e.g., enact another law or
conspicuously enforce an existing law) and claim that it is her actions, not A's, that "reduced"
the risk of terrorism. Employing this strategy, B will not lose credibility-at best, people will
believe it is her actions and not A's that "reduced" the risk of terrorism; at worst, that it was A's
actions that reduced the risk and that B was neither helpful nor harmful.
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000) (making cariacking a Federal crime).
117. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-227 (2007) (criminalizing identity theft); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-9-121 (2007) (listing the elements of identity theft in Georgia); IND. CODE § 35-43-5-
3.5 (2007) (criminalizing "identity deception").
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becomes an issue of excessive concern, legislatures may rush to assuage fears
by conspicuously wiping the slates clean and rewriting a simplified law.'
18
Because competition dissipates the potential arbitrageurs' profits, they
may find it beneficial to collude. In many circumstances, the market for bias
arbitrage would be attractive for collusion. Barriers to entry tend to be high and
the number of potential competitors tends to be low. Politicians and PLSs can
only engage in bias arbitrage if the public perceives them as able to affect by
their actions either the probability of the relevant risk occurring or its
magnitude. An insurer can only engage in bias arbitrage if the public perceives
it as financially able to honor the insurance agreement. An expert can only
engage in bias arbitrage if the public perceives her as very knowledgeable in
the area pertaining to the risk. All of these potential competitors and the media
must have the ability to reach many people in the relevant population in order
to manipulate their perceptions. All potential competitors also must have some
ability to detect a misperception of a risk in order to target the risk in their bias
arbitrage.11 9 Thus, for any given risk, the number of people who are likely to
successfully bias arbitrage is small and is unlikely to increase significantly in
the short term.
The mechanisms of cooperation and the suppression of competition
between bias arbitrageurs are a fertile ground for future research and are too
vast to address in this Article. One expects profit-maximizing politicians to
vacillate between suppressing extra-legal competition to protect their own legal
placebo effects and accommodating private bias arbitrage when they cannot
successfully exclude it (or when it is complementary rather than competitive
with government's bias arbitrage). In this respect, bias arbitrage may differ
vastly according to the political culture of the state, from laissez-faire through
118. See, e.g., David E. Rosenbaum, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: How the Measure
Came Together; a Tax Billfor the Textbooks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1986, at D16 (noting that
President Reagan's charge for a simplified tax code in his 1985 State of the Union address led to
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.)).
119. In other words, a would-be bias arbitrageur must be less susceptible to the cognitive
biases that create the misperception than the population that misperceives the risk. This limits
the spectrum of would-be bias arbitrageurs, but evidence suggests that some individuals are
likely to be less susceptible to a given cognitive bias and are therefore able to recognize and
exploit a misperception. See Rachlinski, supra note 44, at 216-23 (noting that several factors
such as cognitive ability, experience, education and even demographic factors may influence an
individual's cognitive biases); see also Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 47, at 2047 ("'The three
phenomena tested here-anchoring, framing, and the self-serving bias-are well known to
influence judgment in many contexts, yet we found that the insurers largely resisted their
influence."). Cf Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 816 (2001) (suggesting that judges are susceptible to several
cognitive biases).
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government interventionism to central planning. The more interventionist the
government, the greater its ability to suppress private bias arbitrageurs, which
would allow politicians not only to reap all of the benefits of bias arbitrage, but
also reduce the need for government to provide placebo effects quickly. Absent
competition with other bias arbitrageurs, the only temporal constraint on the
politician is the gradual debiasing of the public as people adjust their
perceptions to observations of the objective occurrence of the risk.
B. Artificial Creation of Perception Gaps
An opportunity for bias arbitrage occurs when a gap exists between the
actual and perceived risks, and the benefits of bias arbitrage (both private and
to social welfare) increase as this gap grows. Knowing this, potential
arbitrageurs have the incentive to first create a perception gap (or exacerbate an
existing gap) and then exploit that gap.
For example, a politician may first foster a "scare campaign", attempting
to exploit cognitive biases to manipulate the public into thinking that a security
risk or ecological threat is more severe than it actually is. Then, if successful,
the politician would sponsor a law that would address the security risk or
ecological threat and would attempt to persuade the public that the risk has
been attenuated by the law. Private bias arbitrageurs may similarly attempt to
exacerbate the perception of risk prior to engaging in bias arbitrage. For
example, an insurance company may support publicity that suggests that
medical malpractice lawsuits are frequent, successful and costly in order to
have clients expand their policy limits (at a higher premium).
1 20
Unlike bias arbitrage, the artificial creation or exacerbation of perception
gaps is unambiguously harmful to social welfare. As discussed in Part III.C,
perception gaps cause either excessive or insufficient avoidance of activities
that expose one to the misperceived risk, as well as excessive or insufficient
efforts to confront the misperceived risk. Unfortunately, the ability to engage in
bias arbitrage makes the development of perception gaps attractive to potential
arbitrageurs.
120. See Kent Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1629,
1642-46 (1994) (describing the incentive of liability insurers to persuade their clients to
increase their liability policy limits). This may be done by scare campaigns that exacerbate the
client's risk perception (and therefore the client's demand for, and perceived value from,
insurance). On examples of scare campaigns in the context of medical malpractice insurance,
see TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 152-53 (2005). On the over-estimation of
the risk of medical malpractice liability, which may be in part the result of such efforts, see id. at
68-92.
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The private incentive to create a perception gap depends on the degree of
competition over the subsequent bias arbitrage. Once a perception gap is
created, any potential bias arbitrageur can engage in bias arbitrage to close it.
Therefore, the arbitrageur who expended efforts creating the gap may find that
another arbitrageur free-rides on her efforts and closes the perception gap
through bias arbitrage. For example, a local politician may launch a scare
campaign over crime in her town, causing the public to over-estimate the
likelihood of car theft in the hope of later receiving credit for directing the
police to focus operations on car theft. Before the politician concludes her
scare campaign and moves on to engage in bias arbitrage, the local insurance
company may market policies specially tailored to address car theft, mitigating
the public's concern and preempting the politician's plans. Conversely, the
insurance company could direct the scare campaign in the hopes of selling
high-priced car theft policies but be preempted by a politician who enacts a law
to reduce car theft.
Competition, besides deterring some arbitrageurs from creating perception
gaps that others would free-ride, also reduces the extent of a perception gap that
is artificially created. For example, a "monopolist" politician may want to scare
people about terrorism up to a level of complete hysteria before offering the
panacea (of a newly enacted law or of a law enforcement initiative) and taking
credit for solving a gargantuan problem. But if that politician faced
competition, by the time he would create a moderate scare some other
arbitrageur would already jump into the fray and offer a solution, mitigating the
perceived risk before it reached peak profitability (to a monopolist). If the first
politician foresees this, she can preempt the second politician and offer a
remedy (thus stopping the scare campaign) earlier. The result is that increased
competition over bias arbitrage results in faster but lower magnitude
fluctuations in risk perception.
Thus, the private profitability of creating perception gaps depends on the
degree of competition in the market and the ability of the perception gap creator
to collude or to suppress competition. This suggests that a political culture that
is more interventionist (and thus better facilitates government's ability to
suppress private bias arbitrageurs) is more likely to create perception gaps to
support politicians' engagement in bias arbitrage. These incentives become
even more powerful when the political structure allows certain politicians to
exclude rival politicians from dissipating their rents from creating a perception
gap. Thus, at the extremes, a hierarchal, centrally planned regime is likely to
have more perception gaps artificially created by its politicians (e.g., via scare
campaigns) than a pluralistic, laissez-faire regime.
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VI. Conclusion: The Future of Bias Arbitrage
This Article engaged in a descriptive analysis of bias arbitrage, not a
prescriptive one. I am not attempting to address the morality of bias arbitrage.
However, it is noteworthy that moral reservations have been raised as to actions
that exploit perception gaps, even when the transaction seems to improve social
welfare and the arbitrageur's main goal was not to profit from the
transaction.12
The study of cognitive biases is in its infancy. Improvements in this
nascent field will increase the viability of bias arbitrage in two ways. First,
better understanding of cognitive biases would allow for more accurate
predictions of the degree to which a given risk is misperceived. This, in turn,
would make it easier for potential risk arbitrageurs to identify suitable risks to
arbitrage and reduce the likelihood of "overshooting" by counter-biasing in
excess of the ex ante perception gap. Second, better understanding of cognitive
biases would provide more exact tools for the counter-biasing that takes place
in bias arbitrage. This enhanced capacity to cause cognitive biases is prone to
abuses, but if available, it would very likely be used, including for the purpose
of bias arbitrage.
Bias arbitrage is probably as old a phenomenon as any other form of
arbitrage. Not too long ago, the arbitrage of commodities and currency was in a
similar state as bias arbitrage is today-common but not ubiquitous or exact.
Transportation and information costs caused significant price gaps between
different markets. 22 For example, at the end of the seventeenth century, "a bolt
of muslin cost 3 reals in the mill at La Mans, 6 in Spain and 12 in America"
(300% more than La Mans). 23 In the late nineteenth century, an Ottoman
Pound (a gold coin) traded in Jerusalem for 124 Ottoman Grush (a silver
coin). 124 In Jaffa, about thirty-five miles from Jerusalem, the Pound traded for
121. One example involves volunteers for testing drugs that prevent breast cancer. Such
volunteers risk unknown and possibly very serious side effects of the tested drug, in return for
the hope to prevent the onset of the disease. Doctors expressed concern that women who over-
estimate the risk from breast cancer may be too willing to risk the drug's potential side effects.
Rob Stein, Study of Breast Cancer Pill Raises Hopes and Concerns, WASH. POST, May 22,
2005, at Al ("'Women have an increased fear of getting breast cancer over and above what the
true likelihood is,' said Heidi Malm, associate professor of bioethics at Loyola University
Chicago. 'That could lead people to enroll in studies with probably a bigger hope of benefit than
is actually realistic.').
122. See FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE 168 (Sian Reynolds trans., 2002)
(describing the "trading profit" resulting from transportation costs and information differences
in geographically separated markets).
123. Id.
124. See SHMUEL AVITSUR, HAYE YOM-YOM BE-ERETS-YISRA'EL: BE-ME'AH HA-TESHA'
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144 Grush.125 In Gaza, only about fifty-five miles from Jerusalem, it traded for
216 Grush (74% more than Jerusalem).126 Perception gaps today mirror these
wide price gaps. 1
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As transportation, communication and information technology improved
and prices dropped, currency and commodity arbitrage became less expensive,
more ubiquitous, and price gaps closed. Price gaps that persisted in the past for
months and years now close within fractions of a second. For example, a
Kansas City stock arbitrageur recently moved his firm's computers from
Kansas City to New York to reduce the time it takes for his trading orders to be
executed. 28 Since the computer signal travels at nearly the speed of light,
orders from Kansas City take only 1/50 of a second to be executed.
29
Apparently, many price gaps are closed within this short time. The arbitrageur
stated that without moving the computers to New York, which reduced order
execution time to 1/1000 of a second, he would be out of business.
30
'ESREH [DAILY LIFE IN THE LAND OF ISRAEL IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY] 292 (1972) (providing
the aforementioned figures but not providing a precise date for these figures).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Though both examples demonstrate significant price gaps, they also indicate that some
arbitrage did in fact take place. Muslin was not produced in America, so its availability at any
price at all suggests some merchants arbitraged and narrowed the price gap from infinite to a
"mere" 300%. Likewise in the currency example, the official value of the Ottoman Pound was
100 Grush. Yet the Pound was exchanged for a higher amount, suggesting that merchants
arbitraged by buying gold Pounds for silver coin and selling the under-priced gold to goldsmiths
and foreign mints, reducing the availability of Pounds and pushing up their price in silver.
Bias arbitrage today is in a similar situation: It occurs and mitigates perception gaps
despite the nascent state of the science of cognitive biases, but it would likely increase in
volume (and reduce perception gaps further) if our ability to evaluate and manipulate cognitive
biases improved.
128. Aaron Lucchetti, Firms Seek Edge Through Speed As Computer Trading Expands,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2006, at AI (reporting how trading companies attempt to reduce time it
takes orders to reach the computers of electronic exchanges).
129. Id.
130. See id. (suggesting that arbitrageurs depend on even small delays in relaying
information). Another interesting illustration of the effect of technology on arbitrage and price
gaps is the effect of the use of cellular phones by fishermen in Kerala, a region in the south of
India. To Do With the Price ofFish, ECoNoMIST, May 12, 2007, at 84 (citing Robert Jensen,
The Digital Provide: Information (Technology), Performance and Welfare in the South Indian
Fisheries Sector, Q.J. EcoN. (forthcoming 2007)). Prior to the use of cellular phones, Kerala
fishermen would return with the fish they caught to their local beach market. Id. When fish
were plentiful in their fishing grounds, the local market would be oversupplied, and excess fish
were thrown away, while in markets just a few miles away demand for fish exceeded supply. Id.
Cellular phones allowed the fishermen to call coastal markets while still at sea, and sail to the
market offering the best price (which would be the market with the greatest unsatisfied demand).
Id. As soon as cellular phone coverage became available in a region, the proportion of
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It is hard to imagine perception gaps survive no more than fractions of a
second, perhaps because it is hard to imagine computers engaging in bias
arbitrage. But we may well see an analogous trend of increased bias arbitrage
leading to smaller and less sustainable perception gaps, as the relevant
technology advances. The study of cognitive biases serves the same role in bias
arbitrage as technologies of transportation and information transmission serve
in commodity and currency arbitrage. Reductions in the cost of information
technology allow traders to learn faster about discrepancies in the price of a
commodity in different markets, just as improved knowledge of cognitive
biases allows better estimates of discrepancies between actual and perceived
risk. Similarly, just as reductions in the cost of transportation allow
arbitrageurs to close the price gap by shipping the commodities to higher-priced
markets, so do improvements in understanding how to cause cognitive biases
allow for more effective counter-biasing, which closes the perception gap.
A reduction in the cost of engaging in bias arbitrage may increase the role
of market structure (in the mixed public-private market for bias arbitraging) in
determining the volume of bias arbitrage that takes place. Competitive markets
would see relatively few artificial creations of perception gaps and more
immediate closure of perception gaps through bias arbitrage. Less competitive
markets would see an increase in artificial creations of perception gaps,
governmental and private actions aimed at either suppressing arbitrage rivals or
coordinating bias arbitrageurs and dividing arbitrage opportunities among them.
Either way, such markets would likely have slower elimination of perception
gaps and greater private payoffs to the bias arbitrageur. In markets of either
structure, the amount of legal activity that is driven by bias arbitrage is likely to
increase. As it does, legal scholarship would need to heed to the role law plays,
not only in manipulating incentives, but also in manipulating perceptions.
fishermen in that region selling their fish beyond their home market rose from 0% to 35%. Id.
"Waste had been eliminated and the 'law of one price'-the idea that in an efficient market
identical goods should cost the same-had come into effect, in the form of a single rate for
sardines along the coast." Id.
